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TARGETING THE POOR IN MEXICO: AN EVALUATION OF 
THE SELECTION OF HOUSEHOLDS FOR PROGRESA 
 




This report reevaluates PROGRESA’s targeting methods since the program began 
adding beneficiary households through a process called “densification.” The authors first 
evaluate PROGRESA’s accuracy in targeting both at the community and household 
levels. Second, they evaluate the targeting in terms of its impact on poverty alleviation 
relative to other feasible methods assuming the same total budget. The first step is 
accomplished by comparing PROGRESA’s method to an alternative selection method 
based on household consumption. For the second task, the costs associated with different 
schemes are compared for their effects on the budget available for poverty alleviation. 
Schemes considered include uniform transfers that involve no targeting, targeting based 
on consumption, and targeting at the locality rather than the household. The authors find 
that PROGRESA’s marginality index performs quite well when contrasted to a 
consumption-based model of locality selection. The consumption-based model results in 
a more precise categorization of poverty, which implies that geographic targeting based 
on the marginality index is more likely to result in leakage rather than undercoverage. 
The fit between the two methods is particularly tight for the low and very high 
marginality categories, and is more diffuse in the middle categories. This suggests that 
the PROGRESA marginality index loses its power of distinction between medium-
marginality localities. The analysis also showed that PROGRESA’s targeting appears to 
accurately identify extremely poor households, but makes more errors identifying 
moderately poor households. This finding raises serious concerns about PROGRESA’s iii 
current targeting method for the less-poor areas. However, in comparison to other 
schemes, PROGRESA’s targeting appears to miss fewer extremely poor households. In 
addition, households that are included erroneously in the list of beneficiaries appear to be 
closer to the poverty line than households that are included incorrectly by other methods. 
In short, the errors of exclusion and inclusion occurring with PROGRESA’s targeting are 
less serious than those occurring with other feasible target and transfer schemes. Finally, 
the authors performed a number of simulations comparing PROGRESA’s targeting in 
terms of its impact on poverty alleviation relative to other schemes assuming the same 
total budget. For the social objectives of reducing the depth of poverty, PROGRESA’s 
targeting appears to be the second most effective scheme to “perfect” targeting based on 
consumption. However, it should be noted that the reduction in the higher-order measures 
of poverty accomplished by household targeting over and above those accomplished by 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, the government of Mexico embarked on a new program aimed at 
alleviating extreme poverty in rural areas. PROGRESA, the Education, Health, and 
Nutrition Program, adopts an integrated approach to combating the different causes of 
poverty. Its distinguishing characteristic is that cash benefits are targeted directly to 
households on the condition that they send their children to school and visit health centers 
on a regular basis. For Mexico, PROGRESA represents a significant change in the 
provision of social programs. The earlier anti-poverty program, PRONASOL (1988–
1994), was a decentralized, community-based, demand-driven program, which though 
achieving a high profile, was susceptible to local political influences and not very 
effective at reaching the extremely poor.
1 In contrast, under PROGRESA, statistically 
rigorous methods are used at the headquarters in Mexico City to identify extremely poor 
households and assure objectivity in the selection process. As part of the renewed effort 
to fight poverty, general food subsidies, such as the tortilla price subsidy, are also phased 
out, as they have a high cost to government with a negligible effect on poverty.  
In this paper, we conduct an evaluation of the method used for selecting 
beneficiary households in the PROGRESA program. Our analysis of the PROGRESA 
targeting method comes at a crucial time, as other Latin American countries (e.g., 
Honduras, Argentina, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Venezuela) are all considering following 
Mexico’s example in the application of targeted cash transfers to poor rural families. Our 
                                                 
1 See Yaschine (1999) and Levy (1994) for a description of the program. 2 
evaluation is formulated in the following terms: how well does PROGRESA’s targeting 
perform in terms of its objective after taking into account the costs and the constraints 
(financial and political) of achieving these objectives? Our answer to this question 
consists of two parts. First, we evaluate PROGRESA’s accuracy in targeting both at the 
community level, and at the household level (Sections 3 and 4). Second, we evaluate the 
performance of PROGRESA’s targeting in terms of its impact on poverty alleviation 
relative to other feasible methods and transfer schemes assuming the same total budget 
(Section 5). The first step is accomplished by comparing PROGRESA’s method to an 
alternative selection method based on household consumption, which is our preferred 
measure of welfare. For the second task, the list of feasible alternatives includes uniform 
transfers that involve no targeting at all, targeting based on consumption, and geographic 
targeting (i.e., targeting at the locality rather than the household level). The costs 
associated with these schemes affect the budget available for poverty alleviation. 
 
2. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
Our evaluation is based on a framework consisting of three key elements: a social 
objective; a set of economic, political, and social constraints under which policy has to 
operate; and a range of instruments available to attain these objectives. Although 
PROGRESA has interlinked objectives with respect to health, education, and nutrition, 
we will measure the social objectives or benefits derived from PROGRESA’s targeting 
solely in terms of its potential impact on poverty alleviation. Even though we limit the 3 
objectives of PROGRESA to alleviating poverty, our analysis highlights that the relative 
efficiency of transfer schemes depends on whether the government is concerned about the 
number of poor households as a percentage of the total population (i.e., the headcount 
poverty rate) or the depth and severity of poverty among poor households.
2  
The economic constraints, and some (though by no means all) of the social and 
political constraints, under which policy has to operate are reflected in the budget 
available for PROGRESA. The budget is assumed to be fixed and limited in the sense 
that it is not sufficient to eliminate poverty completely. A wide variety of instruments 
may be utilized for the attainment of these social objectives. Policy instruments range 
from uniform transfers that apply no selection criteria at all to those that involve varying 
degrees of selection criteria. Each instrument has different costs and benefits associated 
with it. The primary benefit derived from targeting at the household level is that 
classifying households into those eligible and ineligible for receiving benefits is a more 
effective way of using limited funds toward the achievement of the social objective (Van 
de Walle 1998; Besley and Kanbur 1993). This, however, involves a variety of costs such 
as administrative (targeting and service delivery), incentive, and sociopolitical costs. For 
example, the mechanism used to identify the poor so that they can be given benefits 
incurs certain costs. As discussed in further detail below, in the case of PROGRESA, this 
mechanism involves the collection of a household survey within all the localities selected 
                                                 
2 As Atkinson (1995) points out, the relative efficiency of different transfer schemes may be hard to pin 
down when objectives are not clearly defined. 4 
as marginal (or as more likely to contain poor households). Such costs are taken into 
account appropriately reducing the fixed budget available for poverty alleviation.
3  
 
3. EVALUATION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE PROGRESA 
TARGETING MECHANISM 
A few countries, such as Chile and Colombia, have used a variety of proxy means 
tests to target social programs.
4 Conceptually, Colombia’s SISBEN index is most similar 
to that used by PROGRESA. SISBEN has become primarily a uniform, nationwide 
standardized test for household inclusion into a variety of programs. PROGRESA, on the 
other hand, using a different statistical routine, combines community and household 
targeting and is linked with a specific policy intervention. The selection of households as 
PROGRESA beneficiaries is accomplished in three stages. First, communities are 
selected using a marginality index based on census data. Second, within the selected 
communities, households are chosen using survey data collected at the household level. 
Third, the list of potential beneficiaries is presented to a community assembly for review 
and discussion and the list is changed according to established criteria for the selection of 
beneficiary families. Given that the importance of the third step is minute, we describe 
                                                 
3 We assume that the budget is fixed, although we recognize the possibility that the instruments used, such 
as targeting, may affect the degree of political support for the program and hence the funds available for 
poverty alleviation. In Section 5, we discuss our simulations with locality-based targeting in relation to the 
political economy aspects of targeting. 
4 See Grosh (1994) for Chile and Velez, Castaño, and Deutsch (1999) for Colombia. 5 
and evaluate the first and second stages of PROGRESA’s targeting.
5 A more detailed 
description of the three stages of PROGRESA and of the household survey used for our 
evaluation can be found in Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999). 
 
DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNITY SELECTION BY PROGRESA 
Communities were brought into PROGRESA using the following process. Using 
census data, a marginality index was created and applied to each of over 105,000 
localities in Mexico.
6 Localities deemed to have a high or very high degree of 
marginality
7 (76,098 localities covering 14,751,628 people) were considered priorities for 
inclusion in the program. Logistical and financial considerations, as well as program 
components that require the use of school and health services, brought to bear other 
criteria on the selection of PROGRESA localities: geographic location, distance between 
localities, and the existence of health and school infrastructure. Combining data from the 
Public Health and Education Secretariats with computerized geographical information, 
                                                 
5 In the third stage, of almost 341,000 selected households, only 1.5 percent were not incorporated, and the 
vast majority of these for reasons of having moved from the locality. Only 423 households, or 0.1 percent 
of the total number of selected households, were disputed and left out of the program. Also, we did not 
have access to data on the numbers of households added as beneficiaries due to feedback from the local 
assemblies. 
6 Data were taken from the 1990 census (XI General Population and Housing Census) and 1995 population 
count (Population and Housing Count) carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia y 
Informatica (INEGI), the national statistical institute. For those communities with missing data, regression 
techniques were used to estimate the marginality index. Details on the construction of the marginality index 
can be found in CONAPO-PROGRESA (1998). 
7 The marginality index was divided into five groups based on the degree of marginality. The cutoff points 
were determined by the Dalenious-Hodges (1959) statistical procedure (for details of this application, see 
de la Vega 1994). 6 
service zones were established, whereby localities were characterized by their access to 
these required services, taking into account the availability and quality of roads when the 
services were not located in the same community (PROGRESA 1998). 
Localities with access to all three services were considered candidates for 
selection and used in the next phase of selection. The localities were then grouped to 
form what were called “marginality zones,” with the following steps. First, localities with 
fewer than 50 or more than 2,500 inhabitants were excluded. Second, using software, 
remaining localities were grouped based on geographical proximity using a routine that 
identified relatively isolated communities. These localities were then also excluded from 
the selection process.  
The geographical and service access restrictions imposed on localities are more 
than likely to have excluded localities with higher concentrations of poor households. 
These communities tend to be very small and relatively isolated. We take the view that 
these restrictions are necessary to the operation of PROGRESA as it was conceived, and 
do not consider this latter aspect as mistargeting but rather a consequence of the nature of 
the program.
8 Thus, our evaluation of the first step of PROGRESA is based on the set of 
localities with a marginality index.  
For the record, Phase I of PROGRESA was implemented in 1996 in nine states 
(Campeche, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis 
                                                 
8 PROGRESA is primarily aimed at increasing household usage of existing health and schooling facilities. 
It is arguable that an alternative way of alleviating poverty could be achieved by building new school and 
health facilities in localities where these do not exist. We consider such issues as outside the scope of this 
evaluation.  7 
Potosi, and Veracruz). Selecting only among localities that had all three services, 3,461 
localities in 202 municipalities were chosen. Phase II was implemented in 1997. This 
involved two steps. First, the requirement that localities have access to health clinics was 
dropped, allowing additional localities to be included in the original 202 municipalities. 
Second, new municipalities and states were added. Overall, 8,749 localities in 483 
municipalities (including the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, and 
Oaxaca) were added to the program. Phase III was implemented in 1998. With the 
exception of the Baja Californias, Aguascalientes, and the Districto Federal, the 
remaining states were brought into the program, including an additional 23,478 localities 
in 1,311 municipalities. Furthermore, in this phase, a number of localities previously 
excluded due to geographical isolation were brought into the program. Overall, as of the 
end of 1998, PROGRESA covered over 1.9 million beneficiary households in 35,688 
localities in 1,488 municipalities and 28 states.  
 
EVALUATION OF THE SELECTION OF COMMUNITIES 
The main objective of constructing a marginality index is to identify poor 
households, or more specifically, to identify localities where most poor households are 
likely to be located. Thus, the ultimate test of how well the marginality index performs is 
whether it is an effective method of identifying where poor households are located (Baker 
and Grosh 1994; Hentschel et al. 1998). In short, our evaluation consists of constructing a 
consumption-based criterion of identifying localities where poor households predominate 
and then contrasting this alternative to the selection made by PROGRESA.  8 
In constructing its marginality index, PROGRESA relied on information available 
at the locality level from the census. Unfortunately, census data contain little direct 
information on household resources and, by default, preclude use of any information at 
the household level such as consumption per adult equivalent. We thus adopt the 
following approach. Using the nationally representative 1996 Mexican National Survey 
of Income and Expenditures (ENIGH),
9 we first construct household-level consumption 
per adult equivalent, classify households as poor or nonpoor using the 25
th percentile as 
the poverty line, and then estimate a probit model of poverty status, restricting the set of 
explanatory variables to those that are also available in the census data used by 
PROGRESA. Next, we take the coefficients from the poverty probit and apply them to 
the 1990 and 1995 population census data at the locality level. Using a sample prediction 
technique, each community is assigned a predicted probability of being poor. Based on 
the predicted probabilities, we use the statistical method developed by Dalenius and 
Hodges (1959) to separate communities into five groups, from low to high marginality. 
This classification is then compared to the PROGRESA marginality index with a 5 by 5 
matrix using the concepts of undercoverage and leakage (Cornia and Steward 1995). The 
undercoverage rate (exclusion error) is calculated by dividing the number of localities 
that are not covered by PROGRESA but should be according to our criterion by the total 
number of localities that should be covered (the target population). The leakage rate (or 
inclusion error) is the percentage of beneficiary localities that should not be receiving any 
                                                 
9 The ENIGH is also carried out by INEGI and covers 13,208 urban and rural households. 9 
benefits, and is calculated by dividing the error of inclusion by the number of localities 
covered by the program. Leakage occurs if localities under the principal components 
method are classified as more marginal compared to the probit method. Conversely, 
undercoverage occurs if localities under the principal components method are classified 
as less marginal compared to the consumption-based method. The matrix can be found in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1—PROGRESA’s selection versus consumption-based selection of localities 
    Classification by consumption-based methods 
    Very low  Low  Medium  High  Very high  Total  Percent 
                 
Very low    613    3,473    3        4,089    5 
Low      5,361    250        5,611    7 
Medium      5,390    7,088    3      12,481    17 




Very High        6,104    27,770    2,357    36,231    48 
                 
  Total    613    14,307    29,264    28,455    2,357    74,996    100 
  Percent    1    19    39    38    3    100   
 
 
Localities that fall on the diagonal indicate that both methods coincide in the 
allocation of localities to a particular category. We consider localities off the diagonal, 
but with just one level of difference, as an acceptable boundary of misclassification. 
From Table 1 it is evident that the consumption-based probit model results in a stricter 
classification than the principal components method. In general, one can observe a shift 
downward and to the left in the categorization of localities. For example, while the 
principal components method allocates almost half of all localities to the very high 10 
category, the probit method has only 3 percent in this category. The bulk of localities 
under the principal components method are in the medium, high, and very high (88 
percent) categories, while the consumption-based probit model allocates them primarily 
to the low, medium, and high categories. On the other hand, the probit method is less apt 
to classify localities in the very low category as well. While the principal components 
method puts over 4,000 localities in this category, the probit model puts only 613 
localities. 
Overall the down and leftward shift does not appear too serious. The off-diagonal 
corner cells remain empty. The majority of localities remain within at least one category 
distance. However, those who do shift more than one category present a problem. Most 
significant are those localities that are considered high or very high marginality under 
principal components, and that are reclassified by the probit as medium (6,104 localities) 
or low (83). PROGRESA initially incorporated localities in the two highest marginality 
categories, beginning with the most marginal first. The probit would entail a fairly 
significant number of these localities from being excluded in the initial stages of 
PROGRESA. On the other hand, the probit method allocated only approximately 30,812 
localities to these categories, while the principal components brought in over 52,000. 
Assuming a similar budget constraint, the localities classified as medium by the 11 
consumption-based probit would also have been brought in, greatly minimizing the 
problem of undercoverage.
10 
For the most part, PROGRESA’s marginality index performs quite well when 
contrasted to a consumption-based probit model. The probit model results in a more 
precise categorization of poverty, which implies that geographic targeting based on the 
marginality index is more likely to result in inclusion errors rather than exclusion errors. 
The fit between the two methods is particularly tight for the low and very high 
marginality categories, and is more diffuse in the middle categories. This suggests that 
the PROGRESA marginality index loses its power of distinction between medium 
marginality localities precisely at a time when PROGRESA is expanding into less 
marginal communities. This will introduce a measure of arbitrariness into the selection of 
these communities. One way to counteract this problem would be to incorporate 
information from other alternative marginality indices, such as the consumption-based 
probit method presented here. 
 
                                                 
10 As another test of the accuracy of the marginality index in identifying the poor households (rather than 
just the localities where they may be  located) Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999) repeat the exercise 
conducted above,  this time applying the principal components weights to the ENIGH households. The 
results are similar to those found in Table 1. 12 
4. EVALUATION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF THE PROGRESA 
TARGETING MECHANISM 
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROGRESA’S SELECTION OF BENEFICIARY 
HOUSEHOLDS  
After identifying program localities based on the method described above, 
PROGRESA proceeds to select beneficiaries. This is done in the following sequence of 
steps: 
 
1.  Carry out a brief census, the Household Socioeconomic Characteristics 
Survey (ENCASEH), of all the households residing in the marginal localities 
selected.  
2.  Construct total household income based on the individual income data 
contained in the ENCASEH survey.  
3.  Subtract child income (from children ages 8–18, the age group covered by 
PROGRESA) from total household income.
11  
4.  Construct per-capita income by dividing the value of income in step 3 by the 
number of household members. 
5.  Compare the measure of income obtained from step 4 with the Standard Food 
Basket (equivalent to an average aggregate income of approximately two 
minimum wages) of 320 pesos per capita per month in order to create a new 
binary variable taking the value of 1 for poor households (if income is less 
                                                 
11 The reasoning here is that to identify the poverty status of the household, it is necessary to exclude the 
income obtained from child labor since this income would be lost if children were to enroll in school. 13 
than the poverty line) and 0 for nonpoor (if income is greater than or equal to 
the poverty line). 
6.  Use discriminant analysis, separately for each geographical region, to 
(a) identify variables that discriminate best between poor and nonpoor 
households; (b) use the identified variables to develop an equation for 
computing an index (discriminant score) that represents parsimoniously the 
differences between the poor and nonpoor households; and (c) use the 
computed index to develop a rule to classify future observations as poor or 
nonpoor households.  
 
The steps outlined above indicate that the classification of a household as poor or 
nonpoor has taken into account a variety of household characteristics that capture the 
“multidimensional” nature of poverty, meaning that the poverty status of a household is 
not based solely on reported income. One of the main advantages of the discriminant 
analysis is that it allows a variety of ways for classifying observations into groups, such 
as the “cutoff-rate method” and a statistical method based on Bayes rule (Sharma 1996). 
The method used by PROGRESA is Bayesian since it offers the user the option to 
incorporate prior probabilities and misclassification costs in the determination of the final 
cutoff value that is used to classify households as poor or nonpoor.
12  
                                                 
12 According to PROGRESA staff, the prior probabilities used by PROGRESA were 58 percent for poor 
and 42 percent for nonpoor for most of the regions. 14 
It should be noted that the poverty rate estimated by PROGRESA’s methods 
generally varies from region to region, and that the average poverty rate according to 
PROGRESA’s methods in the evaluation sample is 78 percent.
13 
 
EVALUATION OF PROGRESA’S SELECTION OF FAMILIES 
In the initial stages of the selection process, PROGRESA utilizes an individual, or 
per capita, welfare measure by dividing household income by the number of household 
members. This measure of welfare requires the following set of assumptions: everyone in 
the household receives an equal allocation, everyone in the household has the same 
needs, and the increase in the minimum cost or level of income for an additional member 
in the household is the same irrespective of family size. The first assumption is 
defendable due to lack of information on consumption at the individual level. Individual 
needs, however, usually vary by gender and age, and economies of scale of living 
together may exist. 
These assumptions may have important consequences on the poverty status of 
large families. For example, the use of a per-capita measure of welfare typically results in 
larger households having a higher probability of being classified as poor (Lanjouw and 
                                                 
13 In Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999), we compare the classification based on discriminant analysis 
with the classification obtained from a probit method. Although the probit method itself involves a number 
of questionable assumptions and is not necessarily superior to the method of discriminant analysis, it is the 
standard econometric method used in targeting studies (for example, see Wodon 1997). In short, we 
followed steps 1 through 4 as PROGRESA, but in step 5 we run a probit regression instead of discriminant 
analysis and use the predicted probability from the probit regression to classify households as poor or 
nonpoor. The very low leakage and undercoverage rates obtained suggest to us that there is no substantial 
difference between the classifications obtained by the use of the discriminant analysis and alternative 
statistical methods such as probit. 15 
Ravallion 1995). The dominant role played by family size and dependency ratios in the 
PROGRESA selection process is discussed in detail in Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman 
(1999). We experiment with alternative individual-level welfare measures and settle on 
using an equivalence scale that accounts for different nutritional needs by gender and age. 
Use of this adult equivalent welfare measure does not lead to major changes in the 
selection of beneficiary households, as compared to the per-capita measure. Due to its 
conceptual advantages, however, we utilize the adult equivalent measure throughout the 
rest of this paper. 
Second, Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999) examine the impact of taking into 
account economies of scale. While the results suggest that economies of scale are present 
and significant, the point estimates are well outside of acceptable ranges calculated for 
other countries. For this reason, we ignore economies of scale in the rest of the analysis. 
Simulation results, however, with typical values of economies of scale parameters result 
in high leakage rates, suggest that many large families would no longer be selected as 
beneficiaries if economies of scale were taken into account. Thus the validity of the no-
economies-of-scale assumption requires more research. 
 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE STANDARD OF COMPARISON 
For reasons that are well established in the poverty literature, our adopted 
measure of welfare is based on the consumption expenditures of households.
14 Since we 
                                                 
14 See Deaton (1997) for a discussion of the relative merits of consumption versus income-based welfare 
measures. 16 
do not have reliable consumption data for the households in our evaluation sample, we 
use the 1996 ENIGH household survey to estimate the parameters of the relationship 
between household consumption and household characteristics. We then use these 
estimated parameters to obtain predicted consumption per adult equivalent for the 
households in the Encuesta de CaracterRsticas Socioecon\micas de los Hogares 
(ENCASEH) 1997 survey sample of 24,077 households drawn from an evaluation sample 
of 506 PROGRESA communities. 
Specifically, our method (described in detail in Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman 
1999) consists of the following steps. First, we restricted the ENIGH sample to rural 
localities of less than 2,500 inhabitants that eventually were incorporated into 
PROGRESA. This yielded a sample of 2,513 households. Second, we constructed a 
measure of total consumption and an equivalence scale to derive consumption per adult 
equivalent. Third, we regressed the logarithm of total consumption per adult equivalent 
on household characteristics (size, composition, assets, etc.) that are also present in the 
1997 ENCASEH data set. The estimates of the parameters of the relationship between 
consumption per capita and household characteristics were obtained using the method of 
least absolute deviations, which yields estimates that are robust to outliers and the 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the data. Specifically, we estimated a linear equation for 
the median (or the .5 conditional quintile) of the logarithm of consumption per adult 
equivalent (lnC) that may be denoted as 
 17 
( ) 96 5 . 96 5 . | ln ENIGH ENIGH X X C Q b = , 
 
where b is a vector of coefficients, and X is a vector of explanatory variables, including a 
set of dummy variables for state of residence so as to account for differences in the cost 
of living at the state level.
15 Finally, based on the parameters of the median regression in 
the ENIGH survey and values of the corresponding household characteristics in the 1997 
ENCASEH survey, we derived the predicted consumption per adult equivalent (PlnC) for 
households.  
 
COMPARISON OF PROGRESA WITH THE CONSUMPTION-BASED TARGETING 
Having constructed the standard against which PROGRESA’s selection will be 
contrasted, we then needed to devise a method by which to classify a household or 
beneficiary and nonbeneficiary. We adopt a flexible approach and base our analysis on 
three different cutoff points (or poverty lines). 
 
1.  A very strict poverty line based on the 25
th percentile of consumption per 
adult equivalent. This poverty line implies that 25 percent of the households 
are poor and 75 percent are nonpoor, and reflects an attempt to capture 
PROGRESA’s stated objective of aiming to reach households in extreme 
poverty. 
                                                 
15 The individual parameters estimates from these regressions are available from the authors upon request. 18 
2.  An intermediate poverty line based on the 50
th percentile of the consumption 
per adult equivalent. 
3.  A poverty line based on the 78
th percentile of the consumption per adult 
equivalent. With this latter poverty line the resulting poverty rate equals the 




In Table 2 we present the undercoverage and leakage measures commonly used as 
a means of measuring the accuracy of a targeting program.
17 The reader is cautioned that 
with our strict poverty line, the exclusion error is the more (if not the only) relevant 
measure for evaluation of PROGRESA’s targeting, since the inclusion error will be high 
by construction. Given PROGRESA’s objectives, the critical question is whether 
PROGRESA’s classification has left out any of the households that, according to our 
indicator, are extremely poor. Also, the highest poverty line at the 78
th percentile 
provides PROGRESA’s targeting with the best chances of achieving exclusion or 
inclusion errors that would be approximately zero if its targeting were identical to the 
consumption-based targeting. For these reasons, this is our preferred poverty line and this 
cutoff value forms the basis for the simulations in the latter part of the paper. 
                                                 
16 Note that our poverty line is absolute in the space of welfare, so as to guarantee that the poverty 
comparisons made are consistent in the sense that two individuals or households with the same level of 
consumption are treated the same way irrespective of region or state (Ravallion 1998). 
17 For a welfare-based interpretation of the concepts of undercoverage and leakage, see Coady and 
Skoufias (1999). 19 
Table 2—Undercoverage and leakage rates of PROGRESA with different poverty 
lines 
  Poverty line used: 
  25
th Percentile  50
th Percentile  78
th Percentile 
       
Undercoverage rate  6.63%  10.80%  16.27% 
       
Leakage rate  70.10%  42.87%  16.34% 
 
 
As revealed in Table 2, the undercoverage rate is 6.6 percent when the extreme 
poverty line is used. In other words, approximately 7 of 100 households classified as 
extremely poor by the "perfect" targeting method based on consumption are not classified 
as poor by PROGRESA. Since PROGRESA is using a poverty line that yields, on 
average, a poverty rate of 78 percent, that means that these households are assigned a 
discriminant score that is high enough to disqualify them from PROGRESA benefits. 
Even with such a high poverty line, 6.6 percent of the extreme poor, as determined by 
consumption, were still excluded by PROGRESA. These exclusion errors are probably a 
reflection of the tendency of the discriminant analysis method to classify as beneficiaries 
households with more children, and to exclude smaller households or older households 
with no young children.
18 
As the poverty line increases, the undercoverage rates increase as well, to 10.8 
percent at the 50
th percentile and 16.27 percent at the 78
th percentile. This suggests that 
                                                 
18 PROGRESA recently added new beneficiaries in a process called "densification." It was felt that the 
original selection method was biased against the elderly poor who no longer lived with their children. 
Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999), without access to the complete data, do not include as beneficiaries 
the densification households. Comparing our earlier results with those reported in this paper, densification 
resulted in a drop in undercoverage from 19 to 5 percent.  20 
the targeting accuracy of PROGRESA is lower for moderately poor households, i.e., the 
group of households between the 25
th and 78
th percentile of consumption.
19 Put 
differently, PROGRESA’s targeting works better at identifying extremely poor 
households. This raises some serious concerns regarding the use of PROGRESA’s 
current targeting method during the next phase of the program, as PROGRESA expands 
into less poor areas.  
As mentioned above, when the low poverty line is applied, the leakage rate is high 
by construction. This explains the 70 percent leakage rate obtained with the low poverty 
line. This leakage rate decreases to 43 percent and 16 percent as the poverty line 
increases.  
 
PROGRESA’S LEAKAGE AND UNDERCOVERAGE RATES RELATIVE TO 
ALTERNATIVE TARGETING METHODS AND TRANSFER SCHEMES 
The accuracy of PROGRESA’s targeting is not directly comparable to other 
targeted programs in Mexico. Part of the reason for this is the fact that PROGRESA is the 
first program to be subjected to a rigorous evaluation of its methods and overall 
effectiveness. Besides, rural households in extreme poverty have never been the explicit 
target of any program before PROGRESA. Nevertheless, from the few published 
estimates of undercoverage and leakage rates for other programs in Mexico, it appears 
that the targeting errors committed by PROGRESA are miniscule when compared to the 
                                                 
19 The undercoverage rate with either of the two higher poverty lines can be expressed as a weighted 
average of the undercoverage rates of the extreme poor and the moderately poor. The higher undercoverage 
rates obtained with the higher poverty lines imply that the undercoverage rate of the moderately poor is 
higher than that for the extreme poor. 21 
targeting errors associated with the tortilla subsidy (which targeted mainly urban 
households), and the undercoverage rates of the urban milk program and other food 
supplementation programs (see Cornia and Stewart 1995). 
Nevertheless, it is still important to know whether the leakage and undercoverage 
rates estimated above are more or less serious errors. For example, if the majority of the 
poor households excluded from participation by the PROGRESA targeting method are 
close to the poverty line, there would be less cause for concern compared to the case if 
they were far below the poverty line. For this reason we applied a weighting scheme 
along the lines of the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) or FGT family of poverty 
measures. With these measures, a parameter, a, can be set according to society’s 
sensitivity to the income distribution among the poor. Specifically the FGT poverty 




















where N is the number of households, ci is the per-capita consumption (or income) of the 
ith household, z is the poverty line, q is the number of poor individuals, and a is the 
weight attached to the severity of household poverty (or the distance from the poverty 
line). When a = 0, the FGT measure collapses to the Headcount Index, or the percentage 
of the population that is below the poverty line.
 When a = 1, the FGT measure gives the 
poverty gap P(1), a measure of the average depth of poverty. When a = 2, the FGT index 22 
becomes the Severity of Poverty index. The P(2) measure assigns more weight to 
individuals that are further away from the poverty line. 
























where NPC is the total of households categorized as poor according to the consumption-
based criterion and q is the total number of households classified as nonpoor by 
PROGRESA. When a = 0, this expression collapses to the undercoverage rate (see, for 
example, the undercoverage rate calculated in Table 2 above). When a = 2, more weight 
is given to households that are further away from the poverty. Along the same lines, the 
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where NPRO is the total of households covered by PROGRESA and q is the total number 
of households classified as nonpoor by the consumption-based targeting scheme.  
The undercoverage (or leakage) rates for different values of a are not comparable 
within a given transfer or targeting scheme. To get a sense of how high or low the 
leakage rates of PROGRESA are, we compare them with the undercoverage and leakage 
rates obtained with two other targeting and transfer schemes.  
The first scheme is a uniform transfer. The full sample of 24,077 households is 
treated as poor. In this transfer scheme, every household is covered; as a result, 
undercoverage is zero. It is the implicit desire to minimize undercoverage that, in many 23 
occasions, has been used as an argument in favor of uniform transfers. However, the 
major problem with a uniform transfer scheme is leakage. 
The second scheme examined is targeting at the locality level.
20 This is a 
geographic targeting scheme of the type surveyed by Baker and Grosh (1994). At present, 
PROGRESA’s beneficiary selection method may result in some households within a 
certain locality being excluded from the program while a significant fraction of the 
households in that same locality are covered by the program, or vice versa. Within the 
subset of localities selected by PROGRESA as marginal, it is possible, with the use of the 
continuous marginality index constructed by PROGRESA, to rank localities as more or 
less marginal. Beginning with the most marginal locality, we classify as poor (or 
beneficiaries) all the households residing in that locality and then repeat these steps for 
the households in the locality with the next value of marginality index until the total 
number of poor households is equal to 78 percent of all households in the sample. As 
discussed earlier, it is essential to have a poverty line that yields the same poverty across 
schemes. 
In all of our calculations, consumption-based targeting with the higher poverty 
line (the 78
th percentile) is treated as the "perfect" targeting scheme, meaning that the 
undercoverage and leakage rates with consumption-based targeting are zero. Also, at this 
point we abstract from issues related to budgetary constraints or costs of targeting, but 
                                                 
20 An in-depth comparison of this geographic targeting scheme to PROGRESA’s targeting at the household 
level is presented in Appendix G of Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999). All of our simulations here are 
based on localities from the pool of localities already selected as marginal by the first step of PROGRESA's 
selection method. In principle, however, the same method could be applied to the full of set of localities in 
Mexico. 24 
take these into account later. Tables 3 and 4 contain the undercoverage and leakage rates, 
respectively, estimated for the various targeting schemes.  
Table 3 reveals that PROGRESA’s undercoverage rate is lower than the 
undercoverage rate obtained if targeting were at the locality level based on the 
marginality index. Moreover, PROGRESA’s undercoverage rate is even lower if we were 
to focus on the severity of poverty of those excluded from the program. Put differently, 
locality-based targeting would have left out of the program more of the extreme poor 
compared to the PROGRESA targeting method. 
 
Table 3—PROGRESA’s undercoverage rates using the FGT
a weighting scheme 
(percentage change in index relative to transfers with PROGRESA 
targeting) 
  U(0)  U(1)  U(2) 
       
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting  0.1626  0.0487  0.0201 
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality index)  0.1896  0.0674  0.0312 
  (16.61)  (38.45)  (55.42) 
a Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984). 
 
 
Table 4 also reveals a generally favorable picture of PROGRESA. With 
PROGRESA’s targeting method, the leakage rate is lower than the leakage rate obtained 
with a uniform transfer, as well as lower than the leakage rate obtained with targeting at 
the locality level.
21 The households leaking into the program with PROGRESA's 
                                                 
21 Note that the leakage rate and undercoverage rate for locality-level targeting are approximately half the 
corresponding rates of  locality-level targeting for Mexico obtained from the simulations of Baker and 
Grosh (1994), who use a poverty line at the 30
th percentile of consumption per capita. 25 
targeting are much closer to the poverty line (less well-off) compared to the households 
leaking into the program with uniform targeting or locality based-targeting. 
 
Table 4—PROGRESA’s leakage rates, using the FGT
a weighting scheme 
(percentage change in index relative to uniform transfer) 
  L(0)  L(1)  L(2) 
       
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting  0.2200  0.0769  0.0561 
       
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting  0.1634  0.0487  0.0313 
  –(25.73)  –(36.72)  –(44.15) 
       
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality index)  0.1896  0.0595  0.0413 
  –(13.82)  –(22.63)  –(26.34) 
a Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984). 
 
 
5. EVALUATION OF PROGRESA’S IMPACT ON POVERTY 
ALLEVIATION RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE 
TARGETING METHODS AND TRANSFER SCHEMES 
The preceding analysis suggests that PROGRESA’s targeting method performs 
better than alternative methods. In this section, we provide a more conclusive evaluation 
by setting the budget of the program at a fixed amount and simulating the impact of the 
different targeting and transfer schemes, inclusive of targeting costs, on indices of 
poverty. The budget is by construction equal to the total amount of benefits that would be 26 
distributed to all the poor households under PROGRESA’s selection method. It is 
approximately 45 percent of the total poverty gap in our sample.
22 
 
ALTERNATIVE TRANSFER SCHEMES 
We start from the case where there is no cash transfer program and a fixed budget, 
and examine the decrease in the poverty rate if the cash transfers were uniform in the 
sense that the full budget available is allocated to all households without distinguishing 
between poor and nonpoor households. We then investigate how PROGRESA, given its 
beneficiary selection method, compares to the impact of a cash transfer program that has 
the same benefit structure (based on gender and age) and distributes the same funds but 
selects households based on an alternative indicator. 
In the simulation assuming a uniform transfer scheme, each household gets the 
same absolute amount as a cash transfer. The cash transfer received by each household is 
the ratio of the total budget and the total number of households in the sample. The post-
transfer consumption of the household (which equals the pre-transfer level of 
consumption and the cash transfer received) is then divided by the number of adult 
equivalent units of the household. 
For the case of consumption-based targeting, we first identify poor households 
based on the comparison of the household-specific consumption per adult equivalent and 
the 78
th percentile poverty line. Households classified as nonpoor by the consumption-
                                                 
22 We do not provide an evaluation of whether the size of the budget is appropriate. Such issues can only 
be addressed later when more detailed data become available on the constraints, incentives, and opportunity 
costs faced by rural families and policy-makers. 27 
based criterion receive no benefits, while households classified as poor are assumed to 
receive benefits according to the structure of the PROGRESA program, outlined in detail 
in the Appendix. As with the uniform transfer case, the post-transfer consumption of the 
household (which equals the pre-transfer level of consumption and the cash transfer 
received) is transformed into adult equivalent units. However, a rule needs to be adopted 
regarding how the limited budget is allocated to the households selected as participants 
into the program. In simple terms, the rule consists of giving benefits first to the neediest 
households and then moving progressively up the ranking of households until the budget 
is exhausted. A household is classified as having more need in the sense that its level of 
consumption per adult equivalent is further away from the poverty line. Since the budget 
is lower than the total poverty gap, 19.56 percent of poor households do not receive any 
benefits. These poor households are closer to the poverty line compared to those that do 
receive benefits. Similar steps are followed in allocating benefits to the households 
selected as poor by the PROGRESA targeting method. 
It is very important to clarify the implications of this budgetary allocation rule. By 
construction, this rule is likely to result in a very small (or zero) impact on the poverty 
rate most people are accustomed to, the headcount index P(0). If PROGRESA benefits 
are given first to those who are far from the poverty line and not to those close to the 
poverty line, the headcount rate is not likely to change, unless the benefit given to a very 
poor household is large enough to cover the poverty gap. Note also that if the budgetary 
allocation rule were to be reversed, i.e., if the limited budget were first allocated to the 
households closer to the poverty line moving down progressively to households further 28 
away from the poverty line, then the impact on the headcount rate of poverty would be 
much higher. We are of the opinion that the latter budget allocation rule does not reflect 
the key objectives of PROGRESA, and for this reason we adopt the rule of giving the 
money to the neediest first.  
The preceding discussion also implies that in comparing the relative targeting 
success or failure of PROGRESA to alternative methods of selection, it is imperative to 
focus on the higher order measures of poverty such as P(1) or P(2). Only the higher order 
measures of poverty can provide an estimate of the relative effectiveness of 
PROGRESA’s methods in identifying the poorest of poor households in comparison to 
other targeting methods.  
 
TARGETING COSTS 
Targeting necessitates the collection of information of a number of variables at 
the household level that are useful at identifying beneficiaries. Such variables include the 
income of each household by source or consumption expenditures over a reference 
period, household assets, etc. In practice it is quite difficult to distinguish between the 
service-delivery costs of the program and costs associated with targeting. For example, a 
large component of the information collected by the ENCASEH survey is essential for 
the administration of the program as well as for targeting. For this reason, we ran three 
separate simulations using a zero, low, and high estimates for the cost of targeting. The 
low-cost figure is based on the estimate of PROGRESA officials that the cost of 29 
collecting targeting information is only 60 pesos per household out of the total of 170 
pesos per household for the whole ENCASEH survey.  
Using these cost estimates, we then adjust the original budget used in our earlier 
simulation by subtracting the cost of surveying all households in the sample with all costs 
deflated to June 1994 prices. Given that these survey costs are one-time, in the sense that 
they are incurred only at the start of the program, and since PROGRESA plans to review 
the status of all households three years after the initiation of the program, we distribute 
these costs equally over time by dividing them by 36 (the number of months of the 
duration of the program). It turned out that the costs of targeting made very little 
difference in the estimates obtained for the impact of PROGRESA on poverty. Therefore 
we report the estimates obtained assuming the full cost of the surveys.  
For the case of locality-level targeting, we assume there are zero targeting costs. 
We use an analogous method and simulate the scenario of PROGRESA using its limited 
budget to provide benefits to all households, starting from the most marginal localities 
and then moving down to less marginal localities, until the budget is exhausted. In this 
manner, we can get a sense of the impact of PROGRESA on the various poverty 
indicators without having to do targeting at the household level and thus without 
incurring any of the costs associated with targeting. Non-economic costs include the 
potential conflicts and problems that can arise within small communities, where 
households that are in many respects similar to households selected as beneficiaries are 30 
excluded from the program.
23 Such conflicts could work against the original objectives of 
the program, as communities may end up becoming more divided after the initiation of 
the program than before. In addition, the possible emergence of conflict within 
communities may give rise to criticisms of the targeting method of the program, which 
may lead to calls for universal coverage or elimination of inequities. If the impact of 
PROGRESA’s second step on the poverty indices were to be approximately the same as 
that of locality-based targeting, then we could safely conclude that targeting at the 
household level is not a worthwhile effort, given the objective of maximizing poverty 
reduction. 
In our simulations we do not consider problems related to program take-up or 
incentives effects. For example, households selected as potential beneficiaries may not 
have enough information, nor find it in their interest, to adhere to the program’s 
requirements. Also, targeting programs can have incentive effects that are side effects of 
their goal of sorting the poor from the nonpoor. These effects arise from the behavioral 
responses of households or individuals as they attempt to become eligible for the 
program. For example, the presence of the program may induce some households to 
reduce their work effort and thus their income so as to become eligible for program 
benefits (Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala 1995). 
 
                                                 
23 Other non-economic costs to targeting may exist, such as the undermining of traditional community-
wide forms of organization. 31 
RESULTS 
In Table 5 we present the results of our simulations on the impact on poverty 
indices. The reader is cautioned that for any given transfer scheme the alternative poverty 
indices are not comparable. Comparisons are only meaningful for a given poverty index 
(that is, a given value of a) across transfer and targeting schemes.  
 
Table 5—Poverty indices under various targeting/transfer schemes with a fixed 
budget and including costs of targeting (percentage change in poverty 








       
No transfer (no anti-poverty program)  0.7800  0.3142  0.1577 
       
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting)  0.6434  0.2256  0.1006 
  –(17.52)  –(28.19)  –(36.18) 
       
Transfers with consumption-based targeting  0.7691  0.2158  0.0797 
  –(1.40)  –(31.30)  –(49.42) 
       
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting  0.7029  0.2203  0.0874 
  –(9.88)  –(29.88)  –(44.58) 
       
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality  0.6948  0.2214  0.0900 
  index)  –(10.92)  –(29.51)  –(42.94) 
 
 
For the reasons discussed above, both "perfect" targeting based on household 
consumption and PROGRESA's targeting have little or no impact on poverty as measured 
by the headcount ratio. These results highlight the point that the social objective assumed 
is crucial in determining which transfer or targeting scheme is the most efficient. If the 32 
social objective of the government were to decrease the number of poor households as a 
percentage of the total population (the headcount rate), then according to our simulations, 
a uniform transfer is the most effective way. Locality targeting comes second, 
PROGRESA targeting a close third, and perfect targeting last. With uniform transfers, 
more households close to the poverty line receive benefits that are sufficiently high to 
make them cross over the poverty line. 
The picture changes dramatically if the social objective were to reducing the 
depth of poverty as measured by the poverty gap index P(1), or the severity of poverty as 
measured by the severity index P(2). Given either one of these social objectives, 
PROGRESA’s targeting is the second most effective scheme to “perfect” targeting based 
on consumption, and uniform transfers are the least efficient scheme for reducing the 
depth or severity of poverty in Mexico. Moreover, since we have accounted for the costs 
of targeting, the higher impact of PROGRESA’s targeting on the depth and severity of 
poverty than locality-based targeting implies that targeting by PROGRESA is worth the 
cost, though not by much. Whether these benefits exceed the non-economic costs 
associated with targeting is impossible to determine within the framework we have 
adopted in this paper. Qualitative studies conducted as part of the PROGRESA 
evaluation, however, suggest that non-economic costs may be significant, suggesting that 
this dimension should be taken into account in order to understand the full cost of 
household level targeting (Adato et al. 1999).  
The exclusion of some of the nonpoor households in marginal localities provides 
the opportunity to include in the program poor households from less marginal localities 33 
The extent to which targeting within localities is economically and ethically justified 
depends on the inequality of distribution of the welfare among households within 
localities and between localities. To obtain more insight on the questions of whether and 
what proportion of households to select within a locality, we conducted a number of 
additional simulations.  
As we have noted, at the early stages of the program PROGRESA initially used a 
cutoff point that would allow, on average, 52 percent of the households in our sample to 
qualify as beneficiaries. After a few months, the formula used to select beneficiaries was 
revised and the cutoff was moved up to let more households in. This “densification 
process” resulted in the current cutoff value of 78 percent of households being selected as 
eligible beneficiaries. The discriminant scores for each household in our sample, before 
and after the densification process, kindly made available by PROGRESA authorities, 
provide us with the opportunity to assess whether this expansion in program coverage 
within has the potential of having a bigger impact on the indices of poverty.  
For our simulations, we assumed a fixed budget amounting to 77.87 percent of the 
poverty gap, using a poverty line at the 52
nd percentile of predicted consumption. In 
reality, the decision to expand the number of households covered was accompanied by a 
simultaneous increase in the budget. We estimated the impact on the various indices of 
poverty under three different scenarios. In the first scenario, selection into the program is 34 
made by sorting households based on their discriminant score before the densification.
24 
In the second scenario, we followed the same steps except that we ranked households by 
their discriminant score after the densification process. In the third, beginning with 
localities of the highest index of marginality, all households within a locality are covered 
by the program until the budget is exhausted.  
The results of our new simulations are reported in Table 6. As can be seen, the 
impact of the transfers on higher poverty indices P(1) and P(2) increases with the 
selectivity of targeting. A stricter rule of selection into the program, e.g., one that allows 
52 percent of the households in the program, decreases the depth and severity of poverty 
more than the current rule that classifies 78 percent of the households as beneficiaries. 
This result implies that even within rural communities of extreme poverty, there is 
considerable variation in the distribution of welfare, making it possible to justify on 
strictly economic grounds the implementation of targeting rules even within the locality 
level and in spite of the costs associated with targeting. 
 
IMPACT ON INEQUALITY 
As a last test of the targeting methods of PROGRESA, we examined the impact of 
the different transfer and targeting schemes on inequality. The social objective is now  
                                                 
24 Lower discriminant scores signify poorer households. Since the discriminant scores of PROGRESA 
were derived separately by region, and some of the households were classified as poor in spite of their 
discriminant score (from feedback during the third stage of beneficiary selection), we took care to first sort 
all households classified as poor, then by the marginality index of the locality (higher index values 
signifying more marginal communities), and finally by the region-specific discriminant score of the 
household. 35 
Table 6—Comparing the impact on poverty under more or less restrictive targeting 








       
No transfer (no anti-poverty program)  0.5200  0.1583  0.0635 
       
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting)  0.4158  0.1076  0.0384 
  –(20.04)  –(32.04)  –(39.56) 
       
Transfers with consumption-based targeting  0.4512  0.0721  0.0172 
  –(13.23)  –(54.48)  –(72.90) 
       
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting before  0.4085  0.0858  0.0264 
  densification  –(21.44)  –(45.82)  –(58.44) 
       
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting after  0.4110  0.0892  0.0283 
  densification  –(20.97)  –(43.63)  –(55.39) 
       
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality  0.4096  0.0928  0.0305 




considered to be the minimization of inequality instead of poverty alleviation. The main 
shortcoming of the FGT poverty indices is that they assign weights only to poor 
households. Thus, households just above the poverty line, though for all practical 
purposes identical to households just below the poverty line, receive no weight. 
Inequality indices provide an alternative means of evaluating the impact of various 
targeting and transfer schemes by comparing their impact on inequality in the total 
population of households. In this manner, the benefits accruing to households just above 
the poverty line are not necessarily considered leakage and are assigned a weight similar 36 
to that assigned for households receiving benefits just below the poverty line (Deaton 
1997).  
We calculated the impact of the targeting and transfer schemes for two inequality 
indices: the generalized entropy index GE(a) and the Atkinson index, A(e). Both 
inequality indices involve a parameter that allows the index to be sensitive to different 
parts of the distribution. For example, for the GE(a) index, the more negative a is, the 
more sensitive GE(a) is to consumption differences at the bottom of the distribution. The 
more positive is e > 0 is, the more sensitive is A(e) to consumption differences at the 
bottom of the distribution. In Table 7 we report the values of these two indices with the 
values of the parameters set to a = –1 and e = 2 so that both indices are sensitive to 
differences at the bottom of the distribution of consumption. 
 
Table 7—Inequality indices under various targeting/transfer schemes with a fixed 
budget and including costs of targeting (percentage change in inequality 






     
No transfer (no anti-poverty program)  0.13112  0.20776 
     
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting)  0.13313  0.21027 
  (1.53)  (1.21) 
     
Transfers with consumption-based targeting  0.06549  0.11581 
  –(50.05)  –(44.26) 
     
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting before  0.08463  0.14475 
  densification  –(35.46)  –(30.33) 
     
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality  0.09114  0.15418 
  index)  –(30.49)  –(25.79) 37 
Table 7 reveals the same general patterns observed for the poverty index P(2) in 
Table 5. For both inequality indices, uniform transfers have little or no effect on 
inequality while consumption-based targeting has the highest impact on inequality. 
PROGRESA’s targeting runs second to consumption-based targeting but well ahead of 
the impact of targeting at the locality level.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The PROGRESA experience and the results of our evaluation of the program’s 
targeting methods provide important policy implications for other Latin American 
countries considering the adoption of similar schemes. 
First, it is necessary to have the right expectations about the potential impact of 
programs targeted toward the extreme poor on the poverty measure that most people are 
familiar with. Targeted programs, such as PROGRESA, may be quite successful at 
reducing the poverty gap or the severity of poverty, but may have a negligible impact on 
the headcount ratio. A program may meet its social objective, but politically it may be 
difficult to sustain if expectations are misplaced.  
Second, PROGRESA’s methodology of selecting beneficiary localities and 
households is relatively more effective in identifying the extremely poor localities or 
households, but less so when in distinguishing among localities or households in the 
middle of the scale. In short, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between the 
moderately poor and the nonpoor once the program has covered the extreme poor. This 38 
implies that as PROGRESA or other similarly targeted transfer programs expand into less 
marginal communities, the chances of making selection errors are higher. A similar 
conclusion is derived from our evaluation of the targeting of households within localities. 
PROGRESA’s targeting is not perfect, but it is relatively more effective at identifying 
extremely poor households within localities and less so at selecting households that are 
moderately poor.  
Third, the non-economic costs associated with targeting deserve serious 
consideration in the overall decision to pursue a household level targeting strategy. We 
find that PROGRESA’s method of targeting households outperforms alternative methods 
in terms of reducing the poverty gap and severity of poverty indices, even after taking 
into account the economic costs of targeting. However, the reduction in the higher order 
measures of poverty accomplished by household targeting over and above those 
accomplished by simply including all the households in the locality are relatively small. 
Whether these marginal successes of targeting at the household level is a worthwhile 
effort depends on the size of the non-economic, or political, and social costs of targeting, 
all of which are very difficult to quantify. Preliminary qualitative surveys from 
PROGRESA’s evaluation show that these costs of targeting in rural, often indigenous, 
communities may not be negligible.  
We close by pointing out that our evaluation of the selection of beneficiaries into 
PROGRESA is not equivalent to evaluating the program as a whole. It remains to be 
determined whether the level and structure of benefits in PROGRESA are successful at 39 
having a measurable positive impact on the health, education, and nutrition of the 
members of the selected households. 
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APPENDIX: STRUCTURE OF BENEFITS 
The PROGRESA program has the following social objectives: 
•  Improve the conditions of education, health, and nutrition of poor families, 
particularly children and their mothers, by providing access to education and 
health services as well as providing monetary assistance and nutrition 
supplements. 
•  Integrate these actions so that educational achievement is not affected by poor 
health or malnutrition in children and young people, or because they carry out 
work that makes school attendance difficult. 
•  Ensure that households have sufficient means and resources available so that their 
children can complete basic education. 
•  Encourage the responsibility and active participation of parents and all family 
members in improving the education, health, and nutrition of children and young 
people. 
•  Promote community participation and support for the actions of PROGRESA, so 
that educational and health services benefit all families in the localities where the 
program operates, as well as unite and promote community efforts and initiatives 
in actions that are similar or complementary to the program. 
 
Upon selection into the program, benefits provided to households are composed 
of three components: 41 
•  Educational grants for school-age children; 
•  Free basic health care for all members of the family and provision of preventative 
health information for the female beneficiary; and  
•  Monetary transfers and nutrition supplements to improve the food consumption 
and nutritional status of poor families, particularly of children and women. 
 
In our simulation of the PROGRESA benefit structure, we assume that children of 
primary school age are all attending full-time and there are no delayed enrollments. Thus, 
the level of primary school benefits received by each potentially participating household 
is determined as follows: 
 
Primary School benefits at the household level =  
(number of boys and girls of 8 years of age) * 60 pesos/month 
+ (number of boys and girls of 9 years of age) * 70 pesos/month 
+ (number of boys and girls of 10 years of age) * 90 pesos/month 
+ (number of boys and girls of 11 years of age) * 120 pesos/month. 
 
PROGRESA provides increasing cash transfers for teenagers enrolled in the first 
through third grades of secondary school up to age 18. Given that we have to attribute 
child ages to a particular grade in school, for children between 12 and 18 years of age, we 
had to make a few stronger assumptions. Given that the enrollment rates of children 
begin to decrease at the secondary school level, we have assumed that PROGRESA’s 42 
program impact will bring back to the first grade of secondary school all boys and girls 
ages 12, 13, and 14. Thus, households with boys and girls between 12 and 14 years 
received the corresponding benefits attached to the first grade of secondary school. Along 
similar lines, boys ages 15 and 16 are assumed to attend the second grade of secondary 
school, while boys and girls 17 and 18 years of age are enrolled in the third grade of 
secondary school.  
Thus, the level of primary school benefits received by each potentially 
participating household is determined as follows: 
 
Secondary school benefits at the household level =  
(number of boys 12–14 years of age) * 175 pesos/month 
+ (number of girls 12–14 years of age) * 185 pesos/month 
+ (number of boys 15–16 years of age) * 185 pesos/month 
+ (number of girls 15–16 years of age) * 205 pesos/month 
+ (number of boys 17–18 years of age) * 195 pesos/month 
+ (number of girls 17–18 years of age) * 225 pesos/month. 
 
We then summed the benefits from having all children enrolled either in primary 
and secondary school grades with the allowance of 115 pesos per month given to 
PROGRESA beneficiaries, up to the maximum of 695 pesos per month per household. 
Finally, we added to the total cash transfer the allowances given to households for 
school supplies, these being equal to the number of children in primary school * (135 
pesos/12) + number of children enrolled in secondary school * (170/12). 43 
The school allowances were divided by 12 since these are provided on an annual 
basis. In determining the total budget to be used in all of our simulations, we added all 
the benefits that would be distributed to beneficiaries with PROGRESA’s selection 
method. All of our monetary values are expressed in July 1994 prices. 44 
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